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The 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis demonstrated how developments in real estate markets can cause
instability in the banking sector and raised concerns in many emerging economies with significant real
estate development and a rapidly growing commercial banking sector, particularly in China. There is clear
evidence that commercial banks in China, especially regional commercial banks, have lent significantly
to the real estate sector. The recent slowdown in the housing market in China and the increase in nonper-
forming loans (NPLs) in China’s commercial banking sector motivated us to investigate the connection
between real estate markets and banking stability. This paper proposes three testable hypotheses linking
the growth of investment in real estate and the stability of regional commercial banks in China, measured
by NPLs. Our empirical results reveal a close connection between the growth of investment in real estate
and the NPLs among regional commercial banks, and its sensitivity to real estate market cycles. When
real estate market activity declines, our results suggest, regional commercial banks can find themselves in
trouble if they have significant exposure to one type of (real estate) asset. In addition, we find that regional
bank competition plays a critical role in defining the relationship between bank stability and real estate
investment activity.
Keywords: financial stability; nonperforming loans; real estate investment; regional commercial banks
JEL Classification: G21; G28
1. Introduction
The bursting of the US housing bubble and declining home prices combined with troubled
subprime loans have been widely considered the direct causes of the 2008 US financial cri-
sis. Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that one of the main reasons for the US credit crisis was
the misallocation of investment in real estate by the domestic financial sector. The crisis has had
a profound impact on global financial stability and consequentially caused a global economic
recession. The US housing crisis has also raised concerns for policy-makers in many emerging
economies with significant real estate market activity and expectations of a future housing bub-
ble. Whether and how real estate market activities affect commercial banking systems is therefore
of great interest to both policy-makers and academic researchers in these economies.
This paper focuses on China, not only because of the size and significance of its economy
in the world but also the special characteristics of both its real estate market and commercial
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banking system compared to those in the United States. Banks in China lend significantly to real
estate developers as well as providing mortgage loans. The bursting of the housing bubble in the
United States caused subprime mortgage loans to default, which was then magnified through the
derivatives market. In China, by contrast, the linkage between real estate loans and banks arises
not only through mortgages but also via loans to real estate developers. When the real estate mar-
ket is expanding, it is extremely profitable and generates significant wealth effects for borrowers
in a relatively short time. During periods of market expansion, borrowers can easily repay loans
to banks, which improves the banks’ loan quality. However, when the housing market slows, real
estate developers’ profits fall, and they often find that it difficult to recover their initial invest-
ment; consequently, the loan quality at banks declines. An extreme example of this is China’s
famous ghost towns,1 where developers have defaulted, leaving many unfinished projects.
China’s rapidly growing real estate market and potential profit opportunities have caused the
sector to attract significant investment. A high average growth rate for real estate investments,
around 28% in our sample, is an important driving factor for the rapid growth in China’s housing
prices (Huang, Leung, and Qu 2015). Since China’s commercial housing market reforms began
in 1998, the real estate market has expanded quickly across the country, and housing prices have
soared over time (Wu, Gyourko, and Deng 2012). This trend was even more apparent after the
2008 financial crisis, when the Chinese authorities implemented a RMB 4 trillion stimulus pack-
age. Housing prices have risen so quickly since 2009 that the government has had to introduce
a series of strong policy interventions in order to moderate the rapid rise of housing prices. A
sudden decline in housing prices could cause serious financial instability.
Another special feature of China’s economy is a rapidly expanding regional commercial bank-
ing system. There is a clear evidence that these banks tend to lend significantly to the real estate
market. Table 1 lists the top five regional commercial banks in China, in terms of size and the
percentage of real estate-related loans relative to total loans and shows that real estate-related
loans account for a significant share of those banks’ total loans. When the construction sector
Table 1. Top five commercial banks and their respective shares of real estate-related loans.
Bank name Year Real estate share Including construction
Bank of Beijing 2010 13.67 (3) 18.11 (1)
2011 11.28 (2) 16.67 (1)
2012 11.8 (2) 17.29 (2)
Bank of Shanghai 2010 15.6 (2) 20.45 (1)
2011 14.06 (4) 19.12 (1)
2012 12.81 (2) 18.11 (1)
Bank of Jiangsu 2010 9.03 (4) –
2011 9.29 (3) 15.09 (3)
2012 8.8 (3) 15.97 (3)
Beijing Rural Commercial Bank 2010 18.87 (1) 21.82 (1)
2011 25.57 (1) 28.06 (1)
2012 15.44 (1) 21.78 (1)
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 2010 21.08 (1) 25.7 (1)
2011 19.36 (2) 23.17 (1)
2012 19.16 (2) 23.76 (1)
Note: Data (in percentage points) are collected from the annual report of each bank. The numbers in brackets are rankings
of real estate-related loan share of each respective bank. The last column reports the share of loans including real estate
and construction.
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is included, the share of real estate-related loans becomes even higher and comprises the largest
proportion of loans in four of the five banks. This situation is quite common at most regional
commercial banks. Such a high level of exposure to one particular asset class can pose a signif-
icant threat to the stability of the banking system, especially when this type of asset is likely to
be subject to price bubbles. China’s regional commercial banking sector began to emerge in the
early 1990s and has grown at an astonishing speed over the past 10 years. This sector consists
of two main parts: city commercial banks and rural commercial banks. At the end of 2012, there
were 144 city commercial banks and 337 rural commercial banks with a combined total of more
than 10,000 local branches operating in almost every province in China.
However, the Chinese economy, including the housing market, has recently started to slow
down. Nonperforming loans (NPLs) in commercial banking sector have also increased to the
highest level since 2010,2 which calls for the attention of policy-makers. The level of NPLs
is often considered when identifying banks with potential financial troubles. Evidence also indi-
cates that banks often experience a high level of NPLs prior to insolvency (see, e.g. Barr, Seiford,
and Siems 1994; Dermirgüc-Kunt 1989). China’s banking industry has faced a long-standing
problem with NPLs, and the government has had to inject a significant amount of capital in order
to reduce NPL levels (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2013). According to the China Banking Regula-
tory Commission (CBRC), the NPL ratio in the banking industry has recently been an average
of less than 2%. Regulating NPLs and avoiding financial instability have been among the most
important policy concerns of Chinese regulators.
China has carried out reforms in its banking system. For example, on 1 May 2015, the State
Council enacted the Deposit Insurance Act, which requires financial institutions to participate in
a deposit insurance system by paying a premium to a fund managed by an agency appointed by
the State Council. The aim of this reform is to further move toward a market mechanism for the
banking industry, and it sends signals to markets that the government may not necessarily provide
full support to all commercial banks in the event of default. In the event of bank insolvency or
bankruptcy, deposit insurance will cover all individual deposits up to RMB 500,000, or USD
81,433.
Banks in China are owned mainly by the government, including the big four state-owned
banks. Over 70% of the shares of the big banks are owned directly by the state, even after they
go public, which means the government would likely step in if these banks encounter trouble.
The ownership structures of joint-stock banks, especially newly established regional commer-
cial banks, however, are more diversified (see the next section for further discussion). Regional
commercial banks do not necessarily get a full government guarantee and are often subject to a
higher level of competition. Given that the regional commercial banks are heavily exposed to real
estate markets, and that this exposure might increase due to a recent change in policy that allows
troubled banks to fail, it is therefore timely to investigate how real estate market developments
affect the stability of the Chinese regional commercial banking system. The literature investi-
gating efficiency, moral hazard, and behavior of the Chinese commercial banks has increased
(e.g. Fang and Jiang 2014; Ferri 2009; Luo and Ying 2014; Shih, Zhang, and Liu 2007; Sun,
Harimaya, and Yamoci 2013; Yano and Shiraishi 2014; Zhang, Wang, and Qu 2012; Zhang et al.
2015, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, however, this paper is the first to explicitly examine
the relationship between the real estate market and the stability of China’s regional commercial
banks using a bank-level micro dataset.
This paper is built around three-related hypotheses, which are established based on analytical
studies in the literature. The first hypothesis is that higher regional real estate investment growth
reduces NPL ratios for regional commercial banks. The second hypothesis states that the impact
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of the real estate market on the NPL ratios of regional commercial banks is sensitive to property
cycles, which is tested using a threshold model. The third hypothesis is that regional bank com-
petition affects the relationship between real estate market developments and the stability of the
banking sector.
Our empirical results provide support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that regional banks benefit
from the rapid growth of real estate investments. Hypothesis 2 explores what happens to bank-
ing sector stability when the real estate market slows or even shrinks significantly. We find that
a decline in real estate market activity increases NPLs and hence increases banking instability.
Tests of Hypothesis 3 indicate that bank competition plays a critical role in defining the rela-
tionship between bank stability and real estate investments. These results have implications for
many emerging markets that have seen significant growth in real estate markets and potential
price bubbles in recent years.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the history and major devel-
opments of regional commercial banks in China, and Section 3 summarizes related studies in the
literature and develops an analytical framework to derive our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses
the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical results and discusses our findings.
Section 6 concludes the paper, offering some policy recommendations.
2. History of regional commercial banks in China
Although the modern Chinese regional commercial bank is less than 20 years old, its original
form, namely, the credit union, can be traced much farther back, to the earliest period of the
People’s Republic of China. In the early 1950s, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) developed
widespread rural credit unions. By the end of 1957, China had 88,368 rural credit unions. In the
early 1980s, city credit unions were established and developed very quickly. Over the next 10
years, more than 5000 city credit unions were established, and they have played an important
role in China’s economy, complementing the big state-owned commercial banks. As economic
activity and financial markets have expanded, credit unions started to encounter problems due to
ambiguously defined ownership structures and inefficient risk management. Therefore, the PBoC
imposed structural banking reforms in order to reorganize the credit unions.
Prior to 2003, rural credit unions experienced several stages of administrative transition; they
were first supervised by local work units (1959–1979), next by the Agricultural Bank of China
(1979–1996), and eventually by the PBoC (1996–2003). During this transition period, the rural
credit unions started to function more effectively as their role became increasingly clear. In June
2003, the State Council initiated a new round of reforms and structural renovations with three
main objectives: reorganizing traditional credit unions and creating provincial-level collabora-
tive unions; setting up joint-equity commercial banks; and reorganizing rural cooperative banks.
In 2010, the CBRC decided to stop establishing new rural cooperative banks and gradually trans-
form the existing ones by directly converting qualified collaborative unions and cooperative
banks into rural commercial banks. This policy fundamentally changed the rural banking sys-
tem, and, by the end of 2012 there were a total of 337 rural commercial banks. Although 147
rural cooperative banks and 1927 credit unions are still in operation, rural commercial banks
have started to play a dominant role in the industry.
Another main part of the Chinese regional commercial banking system includes city com-
mercial banks, which have their origins in city credit unions. Since 1995, under the general
guidance of the State Council, commercial banks have been established in 30 large to medium-
size cities across China to serve both the local economy and small and medium-size enterprises.
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Table 2. The regional banks in China.
Rural commercial banks City commercial banks
Number of banks 337 144
Assets RMB6275.1 billion RMB12,346.9 billion
Number of employees 220,042 259,261
Share 4.70% 9.24%
Source: China Banking Regulatory Committee (CBRC). Data are from the end of 2012.
Note: ‘Share’ describes each respective bank type’s share in all financial institutions in terms of asset value.
City commercial banks are now an important part of China’s financial market, holding about
9.24% of the total asset value of all financial institutions (see Table 2). Their role in local finan-
cial markets has grown significantly. As their business volume has grown quickly, restrictions
circumscribing their operations within specific regions have gradually hampered their further
development and effectiveness. This, in turn, has prompted many city commercial banks to
expand their businesses beyond traditional geographic boundaries. A typical indicator of this
change is that most city commercial banks have removed the word ‘city’ from their names in
recent years. For example, ‘Shanghai City Cooperative Bank’ renamed itself ‘Bank of Shanghai’
and became the first city commercial bank to be allowed to operate across regions in November
2005. Other city banks, such as Bank of Beijing and Bank of Ningbo, quickly followed.
To encourage the further development of regional commercial banks, the CBRC eased restric-
tions on cross-regional operations and other relevant regulations in April 2009. As a result, a
wave of cross-regional expansion of city commercial banks has taken place. Some big regional
banks, including the Banks of Beijing, Ningbo, and Nanjing, listed shares on stock markets.
Their successful stories have been well regarded as role models for a typical regional bank’s
expansion.4
The regional commercial banks’ ownership structure is different from that of the main state-
owned banks or joint-stock banks. In the early years of city commercial banks, their ownership
structure was designed by the PBoC and included local enterprises, private businesses, urban
residences, and local government as key shareholders, with the local government owning around
30% of total shares as the largest shareholder. The share held by local governments has declined
over time and reached an average of 24.2% in 2004 (see the Development Research Center of the
State Council 2005). There are now more banks controlled by private capital, and government
control has started to decline. Overall, there is a clear trend of change in the ownership structure
of the regional commercial banks. Since China’s entry to World Trade Organization, foreign
investment inflows to China have increased, including into the commercial banking sector. The
CBRC allows a maximum of 25% foreign ownership, or 20% if there is a single owner. For
example, in 2012 ING Bank held 13.64% of the Bank of Beijing and Commonwealth Bank of
Australia held 20% of the Bank of Hangzhou. Other major city commercial banks have sold
shares to foreign interests. Meanwhile, the CBRC also set up similar rules for rural commercial
banks in 2003. Based on the initial ownership of rural credit unions, the ownership structure of
rural commercial banks has expanded to rural residences, rural private businesses, enterprises,
and other economic entities. Given this sector’s developments trend, including the change in
ownership structures and government policy encouraging the further development of these banks,
it is of great interest to the central government and other-related stakeholders to ensure regional
commercial banks’ operations are sound and healthy.
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3. Literature review and hypothesis development
In this section, using earlier analytical studies, we first build a framework to establish the
causal link between real estate investments and banking sector stability and then derive three
hypotheses.
Compared to other types of assets, secured real estate loans tend to have higher recovery rates
in the event of default. Banks are therefore willing to lend more in real estate-related loans.
When real estate values change, the collateral values of loans are affected, which in turn affects
both borrowing and bank lending behavior. Herring and Wachter (1999) argue that banks benefit
from real estate lending when real estate values rise, increasing the collateral value of real estate
loans and therefore reducing existing loans’ risk of default. Well-performing property-related
loans and higher returns on real estate investments can encourage banks to further increase their
real estate market loans. In a growing real estate market, banks make more loans and have higher
returns on assets and fewer loan provisions. Niinimaki (2009) argues that rising real estate values
increase bank profitability and reduce the likelihood of financial distress in the banking system.
These theoretical arguments have empirical support. Related empirical studies, however, focus
mainly on advanced economies. Goodhart (1995), for example, reports that property prices affect
credit growth in the UK, but not in the United States. Hofmann (2003) confirms this finding
for 16 countries. Employing a time-series approach to examine the causality between property
prices and bank lending in Hong Kong, Gerlach and Peng (2005) find that the causality runs
only from the former to the latter. In their cross-country analysis of member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Davis and Zhu (2009, 2011)
also report a significant impact of property prices on credit expansion. In addition to the macro-
level studies, some recent studies have employed micro-level bank data. For example, Arpa
et al. (2001), who studied Austrian banks in the 1990s, find a positive relationship between real
estate prices and bank profitability. Blasko and Sinkey (2006) investigate the link between asset
structure, real estate lending, and US banks’ risk-taking behavior and conclude that specialized
banks (commercial banks holding more than 40% of their total assets in secured real estate loans)
are more likely to encounter insolvency. Barrell et al. (2010) estimate equations for early warning
systems for banking crises in OECD countries and highlight the usefulness of real estate prices
as an early warning sign for predicting banking crises. Using data from German banks, Koetter
and Poghosyan (2010) find that real estate price developments can cause bank instability due to
excessively risky lending.
Regional commercial banks in China play a crucial role in supporting the development of the
real estate market in many respects, such as loans to purchase land, financing for real estate con-
struction projects, and other activities. China’s real estate market has experienced an upward
trend, characterized by rising property prices and high investment growth. Chinese regional
commercial banks hold significant real estate-related loans. Based on the theoretical arguments
discussed by Herring and Wachter (1999) and others, real estate market activity is expected to
affect the performance of Chinese regional commercial banks, including their loan quality. In
particular, increased investments in the real estate sector, either by increasing collateral value or
increasing profitability, should reduce troubled loans for banks. Hence, our first hypothesis (H1)
is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Improved regional real estate market activity improves the loan quality of the regional
commercial banks.
Although banks may benefit from real estate expansion, a key question is what happens when
the property market goes through cycles. Hott (2011) suggests that the impact of the real estate
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market on bank lending behavior may be sensitive to property market cycles. When the real
estate cycle is in an expansion phase, banks may benefit from rising earnings or lower default
rates; but when the market moves into a downward phase, they may suffer great losses. Indeed,
bursting housing bubbles in the 1980s and early 1990s caused higher default rates and bank
losses in Japan, the UK, and the United States.
As Figure 1 shows, in recent years the Chinese housing market has undergone a clear upward
and persistent trend of real estate investment at the aggregate level. Despite an upward trend at
the aggregate level, significant fluctuations take place in the short term. When micro data at the
city-level is considered, we observe that the growth rate of real investments in our sample is quite
diverse, however, ranging from − 70.5% to 217.05% with a standard deviation of 30.45% (see
Figure 2), displaying both high- and low-speed growth (even shrinking investments) over the full
sample period. Hence, examining data on city-level investment growth rates provides additional
information on whether the linkage between real estate investment and NPL ratios is sensitive to
property cycles.
Figure 3 plots the correlation between NPLs and the growth rate of investment in real
estate (DINV), which demonstrates that the relationship tends to be negative when the hous-
ing market expands quickly and positive when it slows down. This information suggests that we
should employ a threshold model to capture the impact of property cycles.5 Hence, our second
hypothesis (H2) is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Real estate development and loan quality relationship is subject to a threshold effect.
Recent studies (see, e.g. Davis and Zhu 2011; Pugh and Dehesh 2001) of regional commercial
banks in China also emphasize the role of regional macroeconomic conditions and development
on the performance of these banks. Pugh and Dehesh (2001) argue that deregulation of the finan-
cial sector has increased bank lending to the property market and consequently caused financial
instability in some developed countries since 1980s. The level of bank competition can also affect
banks’ lending behavior. Keeley (1990) suggests that bank profits decline with higher levels of
competition and banks tend to take higher risks when facing competition. Keeley’s analytical
model also suggests that the recent deposit insurance system introduced by Chinese regulators
Figure 1. Real estate investment and growth rate in China. Source: National Bureau of Statistics. The unit
for Investment level (left axis) is billions of RMB, and its growth rate (right axis) is in percentage.
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Figure 2. Distribution of real estate investment growth in our sample cities (in percentages).
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Figure 3. Correlations between real estate loan growth and NPLs.
in May 2015 may hurt bank stability through moral hazard problems by causing excessive risk-
taking. Similar arguments are put forward by Allen and Gale (2000a) and Hellman, Murdock, and
Stiglitz (2000). Using 406 banks in sample countries, Kim, Kim, and Han (2014) find that deposit
insurance increases banks’ risk-taking in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries and Korea. These studies provide a clear motivation for including a measurement of
the level of regional bank competition in our estimations to further understand the connection
between real estate market growth and the stability of the banking sector.
Still, the existing literature has not yet reached a consensus on the role played by bank compe-
tition in banking sector stability. Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Mishkin (1999) argue that higher
levels of bank concentration can cause instability due to banks’ belief that they are ‘too big to
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fail’. Caminal and Matutes (2002) also suggest that banks are more vulnerable when the level
of competition decreases. However, Broeker (1990) argues that competition may reduce banks’
loan selection efforts, causing a higher likelihood of low-quality loans. Based on the theory of
the ‘winner’s curse’, Cao and Shi (2001) and Riordan (1993) find that higher levels of com-
petition may cause more instability in the banking system. One explanation for this negative
link between competition and banking stability is increased bank regulation. Recent studies find
that banking regulation improves bank performance and stability, including a decline in NPLs in
many emerging economies (see, e.g. Fu, Lin, and Molyneux 2014; Klomp and de Haan 2014;
Neyapti and Dincer 2014; Ozkan, Balsari, and Varan 2014). Higher levels of bank regulation
may decrease bank competition, thereby improving the stability of the banking system, which
supports the evidence reported by Cao and Shi (2001) and Riordan (1993).
Based on these arguments, this paper considers the role that regional bank competition plays
in the relationship between the real estate market and the Chinese banking sector’s stability.
Compared to larger state-owned banks and joint-stock banks, which operate across the country
and have longer histories, Chinese regional commercial banks have a clear disadvantage in join-
ing the competition. However, they also have several advantages. For example, a commercial
bank operating in a particular city is more likely to have an information advantage and local
government support. Hence, our third hypothesis (H3) is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Real estate development and loan quality link are affected by regional bank
competition.
4. Empirical methodology
In order to test our three hypotheses, we construct the following empirical models:
NPLi,t = α + βDINVi,t + f (Xi,t) + εi,t (1)
NPLi,t = α + β1DINVi,t · I(DINVi,t > γ ) + β2DINVi,t · I(DINVi,t ≤ γ ) + f (Xi,t) + εi,t (2)
NPLi,t = α + βDINVi,t + θDINVi,t · HHIi,t + φHHIi,t + f (Xi,t) + εi,t (3)
where DINV refers to real estate market growth6, Xi,t is a vector of control variables, includ-
ing bank-specific characteristics (i.e. bank size and deposit ratio) and also includes a proxy for
macroeconomic conditions (i.e. the growth rate of local gross domestic product [GDP]). Year
dummies are also included in all regressions.
Equation (1) is used to test H1. Given control variables, we expect a negative relationship
between the NPL ratio and DINV. Equation (2) is used to test H2. I(·) is the indicator function
(which has a value of 1 if the statement in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise) and γ is the
threshold value estimated endogenously. We follow Hansen’s (1999) basic principle and use a
grid search to find the threshold value. To do so, all possible value of DINVs are used as potential
threshold values in order to define two regimes, and regression residuals are saved. The threshold
value is chosen based on the regression with the minimum sum of squared residuals.
In Equation (3), a measure of the level of bank competition is included to test H3. We use
a dataset available from the CBRC website7 and follow Chong, Lu, and Ongena (2013) in
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Figure 4. Map of regional bank competition map in China (HHI measured in 2009).
Source: CBRC (China Banking Regulatory Commission) and the authors’ calculation.
constructing two measures of regional bank competition: the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
and the concentration ratio (CR, the concentration ratio for the largest three banks in a city).
Assuming that there are K banks in a city and each bank has a number of branches, denoted
#branchk , the two measures can be calculated as:
HHI =
K∑
k=1
(
#branchk/
K∑
k=1
#branchk
)2
(4)
CR =
3∑
n=1
(#branchn)/
K∑
k=1
#branchk (5)
The HHI measure using 2009 as an example across all Chinese cities is plotted in Figure 4.
5. Data and empirical results
5.1 Data description
One of the biggest limitations of micro-level studies of Chinese commercial banks is the scarcity
or unavailability of high-quality data. In order to expand the available sample and incorporate
as much reliable information as possible, we use a variety of sources and collect bank financial
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Table 3. Variable descriptions.
Variables Abbreviations Description
Loan ratio LR End of period loan over total assets
Loan growth LG Loan growth rate
Nonperforming loans ratio NPLs ratio Nonperforming loan over total loans
Deposit growth DG Deposit growth rate
Deposit ratio DR End of period deposit over total assets
Equity ratio ER End of period equity over total assets
Capital ratio CAR Capital adequacy ratio
Return on assets RoA Return on assets
Size LA End of period total asset (in natural logarithm)
Loan share LS Loans of a bank over total city loans of all
financial institutions:
LSi = Li∑N
j=1 Lj
GDP growth DGDP GDP growth rate in cities
Real estate investment growth DINV Real estate investment growth rate in cities
Average wage of employee WAGE Average wage of employee in cities(in natural
logarithm)
Competition index HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
Concentration ratio CR Concentration ratio for the largest three banks
data from different sources. The majority of data is taken from the BANKSCOPE database,
especially data before 2007. In July 2007, the CBRC officially released the Measures for Infor-
mation Disclosure of Commercial Banks, requiring all commercial banks to disclose information
to both investors and the general public in their annual reports. This financial information must
be audited by certified public accountants and is also under CBRC supervision. This enables us to
find additional reliable information about bank operations, especially that of regional commercial
banks. In addition to city-level real estate data, local GDP, and other macro-level data are taken
from the China Economic and Social Development Database. A description of the variables is in
Table 3.
We use annual data from 2000 to 2009 and winsorize the key variables at the 1% level to
avoid outliers. The full sample consists of 138 regional commercial banks (100 city commercial
banks and 38 rural commercial banks). These banks are located in a total of 118 cities. In the
following analysis, the banks are paired with their respective home cities. Since cross-regional
operation was formally authorized only in 2009, our sample period ends in this year. Regional
(city-level) GDP growth is used to represent the local economic environment of each specific
bank. Generally, the word ‘local’ refers to a particular bank’s main operating city.
The descriptive statistics of our samples are shown in Table 4. Notably, the loans of the
regional commercial bank in a particular city can in some cases account for more than 37.78% of
the city’s total commercial loans. This indicates that some regional banks have a dominant role
in their own regional economy.
5.2 Empirical findings
5.2.1 Real estate investment and NPL ratio
The baseline regression results based on Equation (1) between real estate investment growth
and the banks’ NPL ratios are reported in Table 5. The coefficients on DINV (annual growth of
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
Variables
Number of
observations Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
LR 604 53.78 54.35 30.86 72.44 9.00
LG 604 25.88 23.19 − 8.02 91.85 17.39
NPL ratio 604 5.58 3.29 0.31 27.66 6.06
DG 604 27.07 23.21 − 4.57 83.98 16.3
DR 604 84.12 85.83 61.08 95.22 7.47
ER 604 5.38 5.16 1.26 12.28 2.19
CAR 604 9.59 9.72 − 4.16 25.46 4.60
RoA 604 0.76 0.61 0.01 2.58 0.55
DGDP 604 17.35 17.18 − 32.16 98.69 8.38
DINV 604 28.60 23.17 − 70.51 217.05 30.45
LS 604 9.00 7.14 0.22 37.78 6.38
LA 604 16.67 16.68 13.9 20.09 1.13
WAGE 593 3.16 3.17 2.43 4.04 0.35
HHI 604 17.17 16.33 7.49 48.64 5.26
CR 604 60.00 59.71 34.57 93.18 10.14
Sources: Bank-level data are collected from the BANKSCOPE Database and annual reports of banks; City-level real
estate and macro data are taken from the China Economic and Social Development Database.
Notes: See Table 3 for definitions of the variables.
city-level real estate investment) are all negative and significant across all eight specifications.
This provides support for H1. Higher real estate market investment growth indicating housing
market expansion reduces regional commercial banks’ risk of overexposure. Increasing collateral
value or higher profit from the borrowers essentially reduces the probability of default and thus
lowers the NPL ratio.
The magnitude of the estimated DINV coefficient may look relatively small when referring to
the coefficients around − 0.01 across all models. We have to recognize that the NPL ratios of
Chinese banks have been generally low after many years of reform. Although the average NPL
ratio is 5.58% in our sample period, according to the CBRC average NPL ratios have managed
to remain relatively low and generally have been lower than 2% in recent years. Given that real
estate investments have an average growth rate of about 28% with a standard deviation of 30%,
the impact of bank risk levels on the current results cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, our results
are consistent with the literature (i.e. Davis and Zhu 2009), which often reports small coefficients
on real estate-related variables.
Regarding results for the control variables, we observe that the signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients in Table 5 are consistent with our prior beliefs. Capital adequacy ratios (CAR) or equity
ratios (ER) both negatively affect NPL ratios. Banks with higher levels of CAR/ER are safer and
should have correspondingly lower NPL ratios. Larger regional commercial banks (as measured
by size) have lower NPL ratios, suggesting that smaller banks are riskier. Deposits and loan mea-
sures are all negatively related to NPL ratios (although most are not significant). Return on assets
has a positive relationship with NPL ratios but, again, is not statistically significant.
The loan shares of these regional banks in their respective regions (cities) have a positive
impact, suggesting that a bank with a higher share in its operating region has more risk. This find-
ing has important implications for regulators and bank managers. As city and rural commercial
banks in China expand rapidly in the twenty-first century, they need to diversify their businesses
The European Journal of Finance 13
Table 5. Real estate investment and NPL ratio.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DINV − 0.0111** − 0.0109** − 0.0110** − 0.0106** − 0.0102** − 0.0099** − 0.0095** − 0.0090**
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0044)
ER − 0.3710* − 0.3864* − 0.3537* − 0.3697*
(0.1938) (0.2049) (0.1948) (0.2041)
CAR − 0.3126*** − 0.3142*** − 0.3036*** − 0.3048***
(0.0981) (0.1011) (0.0992) (0.1018)
LR − 0.0090 − 0.0177 − 0.0589 − 0.0648
(0.0614) (0.0626) (0.0519) (0.0525)
LG − 0.0170* − 0.0147 − 0.0230** − 0.0203*
(0.0098) (0.0102) (0.0109) (0.0111)
DR − 0.0037 − 0.0082 0.0122 0.0073
(0.0556) (0.0560) (0.0552) (0.0553)
DG − 0.0032 − 0.0047 − 0.0021 − 0.0041
(0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0169) (0.0175)
RoA 0.0598 0.1016 0.2209 0.2460 0.0448 0.0775 0.1851 0.1993
(0.4826) (0.4584) (0.4770) (0.4452) (0.4915) (0.4654) (0.4800) (0.4479)
LA − 3.2781* − 3.8706** − 3.3639* − 3.7621* − 2.6447 − 3.0386 − 1.9929 − 2.1802
(1.8880) (1.8905) (1.9141) (1.9161) (2.0830) (1.9427) (1.9619) (1.8376)
LS 0.3545*** 0.3824*** 0.3925*** 0.4117*** 0.3481** 0.3614** 0.3397** 0.3445**
(0.1350) (0.1356) (0.1340) (0.1332) (0.1459) (0.1453) (0.1392) (0.1375)
DGDP 0.0104 0.0162 0.0104 0.0155
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0164)
WAGE − 6.9552** − 6.3198** − 7.0799** − 6.1805**
(2.8366) (2.6906) (2.8222) (2.6031)
Constant 58.2971* 93.9781** 61.8938* 92.1495** 47.1222 79.0778** 37.5852 62.6964*
(34.2982) (36.3403) (34.2807) (36.4861) (35.5140) (36.5017) (33.2423) (33.6622)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 604 593 604 593 604 593 604 593
R2 0.605 0.609 0.627 0.630 0.608 0.611 0.630 0.632
Notes: This table reports the results of the test of the relationship between real estate investment growth and NPLs ratio.
NPLs ratio is the dependent variable for all regressions. The results are based on panel regressions with bank fixed-effects
(Breusch and Pagan LM test for random effects vs. pooled OLS, Hausman test for random effects vs. fixed-effects all
significant in favor of the fixed-effect model). The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions in that
they use LG and DG to replace LR and DR. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1), (2), (5), and (6) and CAR in
regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
not just in terms of loan types but also in terms of regions, which supports the Chinese authorities’
policy change allowing regional banks to operate across regions since 2009. Of course, one has
to realize that moving out of one’s home city can be risky due to losing the informational advan-
tage and local government support, which may cause trouble for the expanding banks, as they
are also more likely to suffer from an adverse selection bias (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
In addition to year dummies, two regional macroeconomic indicators are included in our
regressions (see Models 2, 4, 6, and 8). Local GDP growth rates have no significant impact
on NPL ratios, but average wage levels have a negative and statistically significant impact on
NPL ratios. A higher average wage level represents the ability to repay bank loans and therefore
reduces the NPL ratio.
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5.2.2 Is there a threshold effect?
Recently, the threat of a potential housing market bubble has forced the Chinese government to
introduce a series of intervention policies. While banks benefit from a real estate expansion, it
may be more interesting to see the consequences of a shrinking housing market on the bank-
ing system. A decline in real estate investment activity may significantly hurt regional banks,
as shrinking collateral value and insolvent borrowers can induce troubled loans. H2 suggests
that the relationship between real estate market development and banks’ NPL ratios is sensitive
to property cycles. Our sample period includes clear cases of both high-speed and low-speed
growth. This is more apparent in the city-level data (see the distribution of real estate investment
growth across cities in Figure 2 as an example). Real estate expansion may benefit banks, but a
decline in real estate market activity may equally harm the banks by increasing troubled loans.
We capture this effect by using a threshold model. Banks may benefit from real estate market
development only when their growth exceeds a critical level. If the growth of the real estate
market drops below this critical threshold level, then banks may suffer more than they benefit.
Table 6 reports the results of allowing threshold effects. The threshold value is found through
a grid search method proposed by Hansen (1999) that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
The estimated threshold value is 21.88%; this means that we can divide DINV into high-speed
samples and low-speed samples using dummy variables. Hence we define duml and dumu as
duml = I(DINV ≤ γ ) and dumu = I(DINV > γ ), where I(·) is the indicator function (which
has a value of 1 if the statement in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise), and γ denotes the
threshold value.
In Table 6, while the impact of all other control variables remains the same as in Table 5,
an interesting finding is the different coefficients for high-speed (dumu) growth compared to
low-speed (duml) growth (relative to the threshold value). The coefficients on the high-speed,
DINV*dumu, remain almost the same as the baseline regression results (Table 5), but those on
the low-speed, DINV*duml, are generally positive and significant, and the values are clearly
higher, suggesting that the impact of real estate expansion on banks’ NPL ratios may not be
linear but, rather, is governed by a threshold effect. Higher levels of growth in the real estate
market (expansionary) can benefit bank operations by reducing troubled loans. Banks that are
overexposed to real estate market development, however, may find themselves in trouble when
the real estate market slows down. A down market (contractionary), which is more likely to
occur as China’s real estate market evolves, can potentially cause significant instability. Hence,
both bank managers and policy-makers need to pay attention to banks’ loan allocations to the
real estate sector.
5.2.3 The role of regional competition
Following the literature (Chong, Lu, and Ongena 2013), we use a comprehensive database
publicly available on the CBRC website to construct a measure of regional bank competition
(namely, HHI and CR) and test whether the relationship between real estate market investment
and bank NPL ratios is sensitive to regional bank competition. Table 7 reports the results.
Results for control variables remain similar to those reported in earlier tables. Hence the dis-
cussion here focuses primarily on regional bank competition and DINV variables. The results
in Table 7 further confirm that a higher DINV reduces the level of NPL ratios. In addition, we
observe that the magnitude of estimated coefficients increases significantly when HHI/CR mea-
surements are included in the regressions. A higher level of competition increases the NPL ratios
of the regional commercial banks (a higher HHI/CR means more concentration and, thus, lower
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Table 6. Threshold regression models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DINV*duml 0.0401** 0.0284* 0.0329** 0.0223* 0.0400** 0.0284* 0.0328** 0.0225
(0.0155) (0.0147) (0.0140) (0.0132) (0.0159) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0137)
DINV*dumu − 0.0135** − 0.0126** − 0.0128** − 0.0119** − 0.0125** − 0.0116** − 0.0112** − 0.0102**
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0046)
ER − 0.3935** − 0.4041** − 0.3763** − 0.3869*
(0.1891) (0.2007) (0.1901) (0.2000)
CAR − 0.3097*** − 0.3139*** − 0.2998*** − 0.3043***
(0.0949) (0.0987) (0.0957) (0.0992)
LR − 0.0137 − 0.0186 − 0.0627 − 0.0657
(0.0589) (0.0606) (0.0505) (0.0514)
LG − 0.0162* − 0.0139 − 0.0224** − 0.0198*
(0.0094) (0.0099) (0.0104) (0.0108)
DR − 0.0044 − 0.0102 0.0124 0.0060
(0.0554) (0.0558) (0.0551) (0.0550)
DG − 0.0033 − 0.0045 − 0.0022 − 0.0039
(0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0176)
RoA − 0.0456 0.0173 0.1179 0.1688 − 0.0605 − 0.0052 0.0834 0.1247
(0.4720) (0.4598) (0.4578) (0.4383) (0.4764) (0.4632) (0.4591) (0.4395)
LA − 3.5997* − 4.0241** − 3.6169* − 3.8751** − 2.8784 − 3.1537 − 2.1775 − 2.2627
(1.8285) (1.8949) (1.8686) (1.9233) (2.0119) (1.9533) (1.9046) (1.8434)
LS 0.3602*** 0.3810*** 0.3961*** 0.4095*** 0.3467** 0.3566** 0.3380** 0.3399**
(0.1322) (0.1338) (0.1318) (0.1321) (0.1414) (0.1429) (0.1351) (0.1352)
DGDP 0.0094 0.0154 0.0092 0.0146
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0166)
WAGE − 5.6879** − 5.1832** − 5.7935** − 5.0469**
(2.7086) (2.5996) (2.6909) (2.5274)
_cons 64.2252* 92.4506** 66.3285* 90.2117** 51.2692 76.5975** 40.7089 60.0903*
(33.3825) (36.6802) (33.6312) (36.9104) (34.3296) (36.5959) (32.2887) (33.9237)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 604 593 604 593 604 593 604 593
R2 0.613 0.612 0.633 0.633 0.616 0.614 0.635 0.634
Notes: This table reports the threshold regression results of real estate investment growth and NPLs ratio. NPL ratio is
the dependent variable for all regressions. The results are based on panel threshold regressions with bank fixed-effect.
The threshold value is found through a grid search minimizing the sum of squared residuals and its value is 21.88%.
duml= I(DINV ≤ γ ) and dumu= I(DINV > γ ) as I(·) is the indicator function that returns 1 if the statement in brackets
is true and 0 otherwise. γ denotes the threshold value. The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions
in that they use LG and DG to replace LR and DR. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1), (2), (5), and (6) and
CAR in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
levels of competition). The coefficients on HHI/CR are generally insignificant, however, espe-
cially when regional macroeconomic factors are included. Nevertheless, the interaction terms
with DINV appear to be mostly significant at the 5% level, and they are all positive. The results
provide support for H3. The positive coefficients of the interaction terms (HHI/CR) suggest that,
in regions with higher levels of bank competition, banks benefit more from real estate expansion.
These results suggest that when facing a high level of competition (often in more developed
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Table 7. The role of bank competition.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DINV − 0.0439** − 0.0378** − 0.0467*** − 0.0411** − 0.0747** − 0.0551** − 0.0809*** − 0.0626**
(0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0176) (0.0170) (0.0287) (0.0275) (0.0291) (0.0275)
DINV*HHI 0.0017** 0.0014* 0.0019** 0.0016**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
DINV*CR 0.0010** 0.0007* 0.0011** 0.0008**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
HHI − 0.1318 − 0.1054 − 0.0993 − 0.0755
(0.1306) (0.1268) (0.1243) (0.1245)
CR − 0.1115** − 0.0884 − 0.0992* − 0.0788
(0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0524) (0.0538)
ER − 0.3770* − 0.3890* − 0.3743* − 0.3859*
(0.1939) (0.2036) (0.1927) (0.2034)
CAR − 0.3137*** − 0.3155*** − 0.3101*** − 0.3124***
(0.0962) (0.0995) (0.0958) (0.0993)
LR − 0.0151 − 0.0227 − 0.0640 − 0.0690 − 0.0222 − 0.0272 − 0.0708 − 0.0735
(0.0614) (0.0625) (0.0527) (0.0533) (0.0618) (0.0628) (0.0531) (0.0535)
DR − 0.0002 − 0.0054 0.0153 0.0094 0.0022 − 0.0037 0.0182 0.0118
(0.0568) (0.0568) (0.0560) (0.0556) (0.0573) (0.0574) (0.0566) (0.0563)
RoA 0.1003 0.1394 0.2604 0.2867 0.1017 0.1315 0.2548 0.2728
(0.4842) (0.4638) (0.4803) (0.4518) (0.4787) (0.4583) (0.4774) (0.4496)
LA − 3.4479* − 4.0495** − 3.5077* − 3.9043** − 3.6872** − 4.2171** − 3.7193** − 4.0604**
(1.9057) (1.9341) (1.9164) (1.9460) (1.8577) (1.8975) (1.8568) (1.9010)
LS 0.3816*** 0.4059*** 0.4133*** 0.4287*** 0.4070*** 0.4250*** 0.4386*** 0.4490***
(0.1366) (0.1401) (0.1357) (0.1379) (0.1326) (0.1374) (0.1309) (0.1345)
DGDP 0.0121 0.0185 0.0099 0.0161
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0165) (0.0166)
WAGE − 6.6953** − 6.1150** − 6.2977** − 5.7192**
(2.8099) (2.7047) (2.8219) (2.7147)
_cons 62.8520* 97.6506*** 66.2108* 94.9760** 71.4562** 102.3688*** 73.7533** 99.3554***
(34.6047) (37.1468) (35.2518) (37.0389) (34.2146) (36.3038) (34.0388) (36.0484)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 604 593 604 593 604 593 604 593
R2 0.608 0.611 0.630 0.632 0.612 0.613 0.633 0.634
Notes: This table reports the regression results between real estate investment growth and NPLs ratio while considering
regional banking competition. NPLs ratio is the dependent variable for all regressions. The results are based on panel
threshold regressions with bank fixed-effect. The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions in that they
use CR to replace HHI as the proxy for the level of competition. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1), (2), (5),
and (6) and CAR in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
coastal regions), regional commercial banks make riskier loans. This supports the arguments of
Allen and Gale (2000b) and Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) that regional competition
gives banks incentives to take higher risks.
We further investigate the results of our threshold model by including regional competition in
this framework. Table 8 reports the results. The threshold effect remains valid, but DINV*duml
is no longer significant. The other results discussed above remain valid for cases above the
threshold value.
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Table 8. Controlling for bank competition in the threshold model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DINV*duml 0.0533 0.0651 0.0366 0.0496 0.0731 0.1265 0.0547 0.1070
(0.0559) (0.0539) (0.0508) (0.0483) (0.1014) (0.0942) (0.0952) (0.0851)
DINV*dumu − 0.0517*** − 0.0453** − 0.0531*** − 0.0475*** − 0.0880*** − 0.0711** − 0.0928*** − 0.0772**
(0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0328) (0.0317) (0.0316) (0.0302)
HHI*DINV*duml − 0.0010 − 0.0024 − 0.0005 − 0.0018
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0026)
HHI*DINV*dumu 0.0020** 0.0017** 0.0021** 0.0019**
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
CR*DINV*duml − 0.0007 − 0.0017 − 0.0005 − 0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014)
CR*DINV*dumu 0.0012** 0.0009* 0.0013*** 0.0010**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
HHI − 0.1063 − 0.0878 − 0.0763 − 0.0600
(0.1273) (0.1259) (0.1221) (0.1239)
CR − 0.0986* − 0.0799 − 0.0877* − 0.0712
(0.0536) (0.0546) (0.0512) (0.0532)
ER − 0.3999** − 0.4085** − 0.3989** − 0.4081**
(0.1869) (0.1965) (0.1844) (0.1942)
CAR − 0.3113*** − 0.3155*** − 0.3088*** − 0.3134***
(0.0927) (0.0965) (0.0923) (0.0961)
LR − 0.0189 − 0.0229 − 0.0672 − 0.0693 − 0.0264 − 0.0285 − 0.0746 − 0.0751
(0.0587) (0.0606) (0.0511) (0.0522) (0.0593) (0.0610) (0.0516) (0.0523)
DR − 0.0014 − 0.0080 0.0150 0.0077 0.0015 − 0.0058 0.0184 0.0106
(0.0561) (0.0560) (0.0555) (0.0550) (0.0567) (0.0566) (0.0562) (0.0557)
RoA − 0.0180 0.0372 0.1451 0.1909 − 0.0243 0.0148 0.1322 0.1628
(0.4717) (0.4641) (0.4595) (0.4439) (0.4683) (0.4603) (0.4594) (0.4436)
LA − 3.7811** − 4.1956** − 3.7742** − 4.0120** − 3.9997** − 4.3720** − 3.9695** − 4.1755**
(1.8394) (1.9408) (1.8654) (1.9543) (1.8002) (1.8991) (1.8130) (1.9046)
LS 0.3851*** 0.4029*** 0.4149*** 0.4251*** 0.4114*** 0.4248*** 0.4415*** 0.4481***
(0.1322) (0.1364) (0.1322) (0.1348) (0.1286) (0.1336) (0.1277) (0.1311)
DGDP 0.0116 0.0182 0.0083 0.0148
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0170)
WAGE − 5.4094** − 4.9377* − 5.0955* − 4.6200*
(2.6812) (2.6049) (2.6996) (2.6198)
_cons 68.5031** 95.6406** 70.5546** 92.5415** 76.4806** 100.6431*** 77.5246** 97.1684***
(33.5947) (37.7884) (34.5109) (37.7289) (33.3090) (36.9073) (33.4091) (36.7210)
N 604 593 604 593 604 593 604 593
R2 0.616 0.615 0.636 0.635 0.620 0.618 0.639 0.637
Notes: This table reports the threshold regression results between real estate investment growth and NPLs ratio while
considering regional banking competition. NPLs ratio is the dependent variable for all regressions. The results are based
on panel threshold regressions with bank fixed-effect. The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions in
that they use CR to replace HHI as the proxy for the level of competition. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1),
(2), (5), and (6) and CAR in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
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5.2.4 Addressing the endogeneity problem
It is arguable that real estate market investment growth (DINV) can be endogenous. For example,
Allen and Gale (2000b) suggest that a bank’s credit expansion and risk-taking preferences can
affect property cycles. Davis and Zhu (2011) show that expanding bank credit positively affects
commercial property prices. Zhang et al. (2015a) argue that the financing behavior of the real
estate sector is sensitive to the supply of funds in financial markets. It is therefore important to
empirically address this potential reverse causality issue to ensure that our results are robust.8 To
Table 9. Real estate investment and NPLs ratio with 2SLS and instrumental variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
DINV − 0.0307* − 0.0290* − 0.0287* − 0.0268 − 0.0301* − 0.0278 − 0.0255 − 0.0232
(0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0165) (0.0167)
ER − 0.4319*** − 0.4406*** − 0.4183*** − 0.4257***
(0.1114) (0.1100) (0.1124) (0.1110)
CAR − 0.3294*** − 0.3285*** − 0.3164*** − 0.3153***
(0.0508) (0.0500) (0.0492) (0.0487)
LR − 0.0198 − 0.0276 − 0.0719* − 0.0767*
(0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0407)
LG − 0.0179 − 0.0153 − 0.0243** − 0.0213*
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0112)
DR − 0.0010 − 0.0054 0.0169 0.0117
(0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0292) (0.0289)
DG 0.0041 0.0015 0.0040 0.0010
(0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0141)
RoA 0.1368 0.1797 0.2820 0.3078 0.1260 0.1561 0.2384 0.2507
(0.5340) (0.5290) (0.5179) (0.5125) (0.5327) (0.5273) (0.5142) (0.5090)
LA − 3.6655*** − 4.2698*** − 3.6915*** − 4.1003*** − 3.0560** − 3.4278*** − 2.2736* − 2.4454**
(1.4185) (1.4899) (1.3694) (1.4378) (1.2268) (1.2710) (1.1702) (1.2168)
LS 0.4176*** 0.4403*** 0.4511*** 0.4650*** 0.4063*** 0.4121*** 0.3863*** 0.3844***
(0.1281) (0.1294) (0.1245) (0.1256) (0.1165) (0.1166) (0.1119) (0.1120)
DGDP 0.0100 0.0163 0.0095 0.0153
(0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0204)
WAGE − 6.7959*** − 6.1347*** − 6.8231*** − 5.9263***
(2.2332) (2.1713) (2.2187) (2.1577)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 587 578 587 578 587 578 587 578
R2 0.595 0.600 0.618 0.623 0.598 0.602 0.623 0.627
Anderson LM 49.386*** 47.363*** 51.342*** 49.039*** 48.005*** 46.231*** 50.841*** 48.703***
C.D. Wald 53.343*** 50.750*** 55.717*** 52.761*** 51.680*** 49.401*** 55.108*** 52.356***
Davidson-MacKinnon
(p_value):
1.402 1.163 1.281 1.049 1.390 1.094 1.038 0.788
(0.237) (0.281) (0.258) (0.306) (0.239) (0.296) (0.309) (0.375)
Notes: This table reports the 2SLS regression results testing the relationship between real estate investment growth and
NPLs ratio. NPLs ratio is the dependent variable for all regressions. All results are based on panel 2SLS regressions with
bank fixed-effect. Anderson LM is the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistics. The C.D. Wald (Cragg-Donald Wald
F statistic) is significant across all models suggesting there is no weak identification problem. Davidson-MacKinnon is to
test exogeneity and the p-value of these test statistics are reported in the parentheses. The last four regressions differ from
the first four regressions in that they use LG and DG to replace LR and DR. For robustness, we use ER in regressions
(1), (2), (5), and (6) and CAR in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
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do so, we first adopt a 2SLS method and use an instrumental variable for DINV. Next, we use a
dynamic general method of moments (GMM) model that not only corrects for the endogeneity
bias but also allows a dynamic effect captured by lagged dependent variables.
Regarding the 2SLS approach, following Chong, Lu, and Ongena (2013), we first divide sam-
ple cities into three categories: municipalities, provincial capital cities, and other cities. The
average DINV in each group excludes one city to be used as our instrumental variable. For other
Table 10. Threshold regression models with 2SLS and instrumental variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
DINV*duml − 0.0223 − 0.0261 − 0.0195 − 0.0220 − 0.0238 − 0.0256 − 0.0159 − 0.0163
(0.0628) (0.0639) (0.0610) (0.0619) (0.0640) (0.0646) (0.0616) (0.0622)
DINV*dumu − 0.0317** − 0.0292** − 0.0297** − 0.0273** − 0.0309** − 0.0280** − 0.0266** − 0.0239**
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0121)
ER − 0.4382*** − 0.4435*** − 0.4232*** − 0.4280***
(0.1017) (0.1008) (0.1016) (0.1005)
CAR − 0.3291*** − 0.3292*** − 0.3158*** − 0.3161***
(0.0511) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0489)
LR − 0.0208 − 0.0266 − 0.0731* − 0.0761*
(0.0398) (0.0402) (0.0395) (0.0397)
LG − 0.0177 − 0.0151 − 0.0241** − 0.0211*
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0112)
DR − 0.0010 − 0.0067 0.0172 0.0106
(0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0290) (0.0288)
DG 0.0043 0.0017 0.0041 0.0012
(0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0137)
RoA 0.1220 0.1836 0.2622 0.3055 0.1145 0.1617 0.2169 0.2432
(0.5483) (0.5517) (0.5357) (0.5382) (0.5486) (0.5512) (0.5331) (0.5353)
LA − 3.7300*** − 4.2771*** − 3.7539*** − 4.1105*** − 3.0967*** − 3.4395*** − 2.3283** − 2.4686**
(1.3865) (1.4575) (1.3432) (1.4117) (1.1841) (1.2331) (1.1418) (1.1910)
LS 0.4207*** 0.4377*** 0.4540*** 0.4630*** 0.4076*** 0.4098*** 0.3880*** 0.3829***
(0.1223) (0.1245) (0.1195) (0.1213) (0.1130) (0.1133) (0.1090) (0.1093)
DGDP 0.0098 0.0160 0.0093 0.0148
(0.0214) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0205)
WAGE − 6.1959*** − 5.5053** − 6.2242*** − 5.2468**
(2.3580) (2.2809) (2.3302) (2.2472)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 587 578 587 578 587 578 587 578
R2 0.597 0.599 0.620 0.623 0.599 0.602 0.624 0.627
Anderson LM 33.036*** 32.987*** 33.315*** 33.260*** 31.747*** 32.122*** 32.366*** 32.663***
C.D. Wald 17.130*** 17.036*** 17.286*** 17.189*** 16.412*** 16.556*** 16.757*** 16.856***
Notes: This table reports the threshold regression with IV (2SLS regressions) results between real estate investment
growth and NPLs ratio. NPLs ratio is the dependent variable for all regressions. All results are based on panel 2SLS
regressions with bank fixed-effect. Anderson LM is the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistics. The C.D. Wald
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) are significant across all models suggesting there is no weak identification problem. The
threshold value is found through a grid search minimizing the sum of squared residuals and its value is 22.48%. duml =
I(DINV ≤ γ ) and dumu = I(DINV > γ ) as I(·) is the indicator function returning 1 if the statement in parentheses is
true and 0 otherwise. γ denotes the threshold value. The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions in that
they use LG and DG to replace LR and DR. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1), (2), (5), and (6) and CAR in
regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
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cities, we use the average DINV of other cities within the same province as the instrumental
variable.
Table 9 reports the 2SLS regression results for all models in Table 5. Tests for the validity
of instrumental variables are all significant, suggesting the validity of the instruments. Both the
Anderson canonical correlation LM statistics and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are highly
significant. The significance level of the DINV falls as only half our estimated models now give
Table 11. The role of bank competition with 2SLS and instrumental variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DINV − 0.1868*** − 0.1624** − 0.1609*** − 0.1399** − 0.2670*** − 0.2217** − 0.2275** − 0.1871*
(0.0657) (0.0664) (0.0620) (0.0631) (0.0997) (0.1013) (0.0946) (0.0965)
DINV*HHI 0.0081*** 0.0069** 0.0068** 0.0058**
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0029)
DINV*CR 0.0037*** 0.0030** 0.0031** 0.0025*
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
HHI − 0.3245** − 0.2768** − 0.2426** − 0.2028*
(0.1264) (0.1294) (0.1197) (0.1231)
CR − 0.1914*** − 0.1595*** − 0.1570*** − 0.1293**
(0.0579) (0.0597) (0.0550) (0.0569)
ER − 0.4449*** − 0.4481*** − 0.4342*** − 0.4396***
(0.1158) (0.1135) (0.1137) (0.1120)
CAR − 0.3379*** − 0.3366*** − 0.3318*** − 0.3316***
(0.0525) (0.0515) (0.0518) (0.0511)
LR − 0.0381 − 0.0438 − 0.0879** − 0.0906** − 0.0488 − 0.0502 − 0.0964** − 0.0956**
(0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0429) (0.0428)
DR 0.0095 0.0030 0.0257 0.0184 0.0157 0.0085 0.0310 0.0232
(0.0314) (0.0309) (0.0302) (0.0298) (0.0313) (0.0310) (0.0302) (0.0300)
RoA 0.3070 0.3561 0.4290 0.4621 0.2206 0.2571 0.3532 0.3753
(0.5574) (0.5516) (0.5343) (0.5294) (0.5450) (0.5396) (0.5239) (0.5190)
LA − 4.2356*** − 4.8579*** − 4.1573*** − 4.5637*** − 4.3751*** − 4.8545*** − 4.2772*** − 4.5764***
(1.4923) (1.5669) (1.4223) (1.4953) (1.4732) (1.5434) (1.4077) (1.4765)
LS 0.4921*** 0.5082*** 0.5104*** 0.5178*** 0.5135*** 0.5201*** 0.5306*** 0.5305***
(0.1377) (0.1392) (0.1321) (0.1337) (0.1372) (0.1384) (0.1319) (0.1333)
DGDP 0.0205 0.0256 0.0125 0.0184
(0.0223) (0.0215) (0.0217) (0.0209)
WAGE − 6.0079*** − 5.5151** − 5.4294** − 5.0152**
(2.3236) (2.2388) (2.3363) (2.2561)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 587 578 587 578 587 578 587 578
R2 0.568 0.578 0.602 0.610 0.581 0.587 0.612 0.617
Anderson LM statistic 40.622*** 38.361*** 42.110*** 39.471*** 39.569*** 37.330*** 41.059*** 38.479***
Cragg-Donald Wald 21.391*** 20.020*** 22.252*** 20.654*** 20.785*** 19.434*** 21.643*** 20.087***
Notes: This table reports the 2SLS IV regression results between real estate investment growth and NPLs ratio while
considering regional banking competition. The dependent variable is NPLs ratio for all regressions. All results are based
on panel 2SLS regressions with bank fixed-effect. Anderson LM is the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistics. The
C.D. Wald (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) are significant across all models suggesting there is no weak identification
problem. The last four regressions differ from the first four regressions in that they use CR to replace HHI as the proxy
for the level of competition. For robustness, we use ER in regressions (1), (2), (5), and (6) and CAR in regressions (3),
(4), (7), and (8). See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. The robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
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significant results for it at the 10% level. For those significant cases, however, the economic
significance of the estimated coefficients rises quite significantly. Combined, the results provide
reasonably good support for H1.
For tests of H2 and H3, we report 2SLS regression results in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. In
general, the Anderson canonical correlation LM statistics and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics
are highly significant. The results of 2SLS regressions for both hypotheses are roughly consis-
tent with the baseline regression results. The positive impact from DINV disappears when the
Table 12. Dynamic regression results.
Panel I: H1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.NPLs ratio 0.4671*** 0.4596*** 0.4695*** 0.4661***
(0.0367) (0.0376) (0.0357) (0.0365)
DINV − 0.0125** − 0.0136** − 0.0066 − 0.0072
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0055)
Panel II: H2 (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.NPLs ratio 0.4370*** 0.4422*** 0.4476*** 0.4509***
(0.0345) (0.0357) (0.0343) (0.0354)
DINV*duml 0.0102 0.0186 0.0069 0.0141
(0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0171)
DINV*dumu − 0.0117** − 0.0119** − 0.0096* − 0.0089*
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Panel III:H3.HHI (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.NPLs ratio 0.4620*** 0.4540*** 0.4621*** 0.4599***
(0.0369) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0367)
DINV − 0.0534** − 0.0551** − 0.0367 − 0.0374*
(0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0225)
DINV*HHI 0.0024** 0.0024** 0.0016 0.0016
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
HHI − 0.1594* − 0.1986** − 0.1385 − 0.1471
(0.0910) (0.0932) (0.0891) (0.0908)
Panel IV: H3.CR (1) (2) (3) (4)
L.NPLs ratio 0.4590*** 0.4527*** 0.4609*** 0.4594***
(0.0372) (0.0378) (0.0364) (0.0369)
DINV − 0.0519 − 0.0498 − 0.0231 − 0.0199
(0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0387) (0.0388)
DINV*CR 0.0007 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
CR − 0.0742* − 0.0852** − 0.0591 − 0.0628
(0.0411) (0.0421) (0.0404) (0.0412)
Notes: The dynamic panel regressions in this table are estimated using GMM based on the first difference. The inde-
pendent variables include the lagged dependent variable and the same explanatory variables as described in previous
non-dynamic regressions. The coefficients of other control variables are omitted to save space. Panels I and II refer to the
regression specifications for testing the first two testable hypotheses; Panels III and IV are for the third testable hypothesis
but differ by using HHI/CR as the measure of competition. See Table 3 for definitions of the variables. Models (1) and (2)
use ER and Models (3) and (4) use CAR as the alternative. Models (2) and (4) include regional macroeconomic factors
and Models (1) and (3) exclude them. All regressions pass the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions and there is
no evidence of second order autoregression. These results underline the validity of the instruments and the consistency
of the estimators. The standard errors are in parentheses.*** Significance level at 1%.
** Significance level at 5%.
* Significance level at 10%.
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growth rate is lower than the threshold value (insignificant). But there are still clear statistical
differences for the impact below/above the threshold values. Both the DINV coefficients and the
interaction terms with HHI/CR are still significant and have the same sign as in baseline regres-
sions (Table 7). In general, these results (irrespective of model specification used) support all
three hypotheses. Overall, 2SLS regression results show that our main results hold.
In order to control for the possibility that these regional commercial banks may have an auto-
correlated NPL ratio, it might be useful to check the robustness of our results by including a
dynamic effect along with dealing with the endogeneity bias. Table 12 reports the dynamic model
estimated via system GMM, which we believe produces more reliable inferences than 2SLS due
to the reported significant dynamic effect. In general, there is clear evidence that these regional
commercial banks’ NPL ratios are positively auto-correlated. Accounting for dynamic effects,
however, does not affect our inferences for all three hypotheses. Overall, our three hypotheses
hold when we correct for the endogeneity bias using both 2SLS and GMM approaches.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
A key lesson we have learned from the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis is that overexposure to
one type of asset, such as real estate, and the misallocation of investments by financial institutions
toward assets can cause significant instability in the financial sector. Given China’s booming real
estate market and significant exposure of its regional banks to real estate loans, our research
contributes to concerns of how the dynamics of China’s real estate market can affect financial
stability, using regional commercial banks as an example. We study a panel of Chinese regional
commercial banks to show the impact of real estate market developments on banking sector
stability, as measured by NPL ratios. Based on theoretical studies in the existing literature, we
proposed three hypotheses.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we find that an increase in the
growth of investment in real estate reduces NPL ratios, supporting H1. Allowing for threshold
effects, however, our data shows that the relationship between real estate market activity and
banking sector stability is sensitive to real estate market cycles, H2. Compared to the benefits of
real estate expansion, a declining real estate market seems to do more harm to banks. The impli-
cation of these findings for policy-makers and bank managers is that holding higher stakes in
real estate is risky. When the real estate market is in trouble and starts shrinking, banks with high
concentrations of loans in the real estate sector are more likely to become unstable. Addition-
ally, systematic misallocation of investments toward the real estate sector can cause significant
instability for the entire financial system.
The results of H3 indicate further challenges for regulators. The standard argument for intro-
ducing competition to the banking industry is that it improves bank efficiency and serves the
real economy better. On the contrary, our results for China’s regional commercial banks sug-
gest that higher banking competition induces more risk-taking activities, supporting some of the
arguments debated in the literature. While bank competition increases the benefits of real estate
market expansion, banks may suffer even higher losses when the real estate market declines.
Although support for bank competition is beneficial, our results suggest that regulators need to
pay more attention to regional banks’ risk of overexposure to the real estate market.
Our results also have broader implications. Many other emerging economies have experienced
real estate booms, and their banking sectors are taking a larger role in real economic activity. For
example, in addition to China, other Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)
economies have also had significant housing price increases and faced price bubbles in recent
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years. A sudden drop in housing prices in any of the BRICS economies can easily destabilize the
banking system, and this could easily spread to other countries. Given the growing significance
of BRICS and other emerging economies in the global economy, including their increasing share
of world GDP, banking and financial system instability within countries could lead to global
financial instability.
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2. http://www.ft.com/fastft/372301/china-bad-loan-growth-accelerates/.
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Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Singapore, Serbia, Russia, Taiwan, Turkey, and
Uruguay. The following website provides charts showing the dramatic increase in property prices in recent years
in these markets. http://www.thebubblebubble.com/emerging-markets-bubble/.
4. For more information about the development and history of China’s commercial banks, see Berger, Hasan, and Zhou
(2009), Ferri (2009), Lin and Zhang (2009), and Matthews and Zhang (2010).
5. Other recent studies that also adopt a threshold approach include Gasha and Morales (2004), Law, Tan, and Azman-
Saini (2014), Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009), Pan and Wang (2013), and Zhang et al. (2015b).
6. We have also tested the significance of additional lags of real estate loans, DINV, and the results are consistent
(results are available upon request). We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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